





The national foreclosure crisis has caused there to be millions more vacancies in our housing stock than before.  Vacant 
homes lower their community’s property values and quality of life. Neighbors and public ofﬁ  cials know foreclosed homes 
sit empty for months, but precise measures of foreclosure-related vacancy are rare. Using data from Cuyahoga County, 
Ohio, I trace the rise and fall in the vacancy rates of homes during the 18 months following their foreclosure. Ominously, 
the data suggest that foreclosure may permanently scar some homes.  Foreclosed homes still have higher vacancy 
rates than neighboring houses two to ﬁ  ve years after a sheriff’s sale.
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As the housing market staggers into its ﬁ  fth year of decline, 
the issues of foreclosure and vacancy continue to demand 
our attention. In 2010, 1.85 million consumers nationwide 
received a new foreclosure notice, compared to between 
600,000 and 800,000 in the “normal” times of a decade 
earlier. 
Almost all foreclosed homes are at least temporarily vacant; 
as long as they remain so, they impact the home values and 
quality of life in their neighborhoods. What if the vacancy 
associated with foreclosure lingers on long after the fore-
closure? Could the rise in foreclosures translate into both a 
short- and a long-term increase in vacancy? 
Using a unique data set covering Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 
I explore whether foreclosed homes are reoccupied at rates 
similar to those of other recently sold homes. The data 
reveal that foreclosed homes go through more than a year 
of very high vacancy rates following the auction and are 
substantially more likely to be vacant up to 60 months after 
the foreclosure. 
The distribution of foreclosures is heavily weighted toward 
high-poverty areas, and homes in these areas are more likely 
to be vacant long after they are sold. However, even com-
pared to homes in census tracts with similar poverty levels, 
foreclosed homes show higher vacancy rates than others 
years after the auction.
The Impact of Vacancy 
Foreclosure and the vacancy it causes are a concern for 
policymakers because a foreclosure’s impact extends to hun-
dreds of people in the neighboring community. A foreclo-
sure adds one more home to the supply on the market and 
so depresses the prices of all homes sold in the area. This 
leads to smaller gains or larger losses for people who must 
sell in the current market and devalues the largest asset 
most households own—their house. This lower value limits 
homeowners’ ability to extract equity for expenses such as 
home improvements, starting a business, college tuition, or 
retirement. Owners of depreciated homes may constrain 
their spending to try to make up for the lost wealth, and this 
can act as a drag on economic growth. 
A vacant home can also lower property values, even if it 
is not for sale. Vacant homes are often part of a “shadow 
inventory” because the owners intend to put them on the 
market when demand recovers. Every month, some of these 
owners will decide that the costs of holding an empty house 
outweigh the beneﬁ  ts of waiting. In locations with a lot of 
shadow inventory in addition to the active inventory, there 
is downward pressure on home prices. 
Moreover, the exterior of a vacant home is usually less 
likely to be well-maintained than an occupied one. This 
detracts from the vitality of the neighborhood and the prices 
buyers are willing to pay for nearby homes. In high-crime 
areas, unoccupied homes are often broken into, stripped of 
valuable metals, and vandalized. In some cases, criminals 
move into the homes and run illegal operations from them. 
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Notes: Foreclosed homes are deﬁ  ned as homes sold at a sheriff’s sale. Nonfore-
closed homes are the remainder of homes sold. Vacancy is deﬁ  ned as a home 
being unoccupied for 90 days or more. Occupancy rates for each month from 
sale include all homes that can be observed with that number of months between 
the sale and the vacancy designation.
Sources: Author’s calculations using all home sales recorded in Cuyahoga County 
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Figure 2. Percent of Foreclosed Homes Awaiting Resale, 
by Type of Buyer
Data on the vacancy of individual homes are more dif-
ﬁ  cult to obtain, so only one study so far has estimated the 
impact of vacant homes on nearby property values. Brian 
Mikelbank used data, collected by the City of Columbus, 
which identiﬁ  ed vacant and abandoned homes along with 
foreclosures. He estimated that a vacant home reduced the 
sale price of nearby homes by 3.6 percent in the year follow-
ing the city’s survey. Controlling for vacancies reduced the 
estimated impact of the foreclosures, reﬂ  ecting the strong 
relationship between the two. Anecdotal information and 
aggregate ﬁ  gures suggest that foreclosures cause additional 
vacancies, but the relationship needs further study using 
data on individual properties.
A Study of One Ohio County
To study whether foreclosure increases the length of time 
homes stay vacant, a set of data have to be constructed. I fo-
cused on Cuyahoga County, a populous counties hit hard by 
the foreclosure crisis. I used county sales records from 2006 
to 2010, and for vacancy data, I used the U.S. Postal Ser-
vice’s address database. Homes are recorded as vacant in the 
USPS database if they have been vacant for at least 90 days. 
Actual vacancy rates are likely higher because there are many 
short-term vacancies that are not captured in these data.
The vacancy observations used in this analysis were all 
made in 2010. Figures that represent how many homes 
As foreclosures have increased in recent years, so have the 
studies that estimate their economic impact. It is not sur-
prising that economists have been able to detect a distinct 
difference in prices for homes near a recently foreclosed 
property. John Harding, Eric Rosenblatt, and Vincent Yao 
used data from seven metro areas to estimate the impact 
of a foreclosure on the sale prices of nearby homes. Their 
results suggest that a distressed property within 300 feet 
of a home sale will lower the sale price by 1 percent. John 
Campbell, Stefano Giglio, and Parag Pathak report a 
similar ﬁ  nding in their study, which analyzes two decades 
of sales records from Massachusetts. They observe that 
a foreclosure within 264 feet reduced the sale price of a 
house by 1 percent. These two studies build on a list of 
similar published ﬁ  ndings.
In articles on foreclosure, authors usually note that fore-
closures lead to vacancies, which can depress sales prices 
through the supply and disamenity channels discussed 
above. A study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s 
Dan Hartley estimates the strength of the two channels 
separately. He ﬁ  nds that foreclosures in high-vacancy 
neighborhoods depressed prices by 2 percent via a disame-
nity effect, whereas foreclosures in low-vacancy neighbor-
hoods depressed prices by 1.6 percent via a supply effect.
Parcel-level foreclosure data are widely available because 
the process must be recorded in court and property records. 
Sources: Author’s calculations using all home sales recorded in Cuyahoga County 
from 2006 to 2010 and vacancy data from the U.S. Postal Service.
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Homes, by Poverty Level
Figure 3. Occupancy before and after Home Sale
Sources: Author’s calculations using all home sales recorded in Cuyahoga County 
from 2006 to 2010 and vacancy data from the U.S. Postal Service.
are vacant four or ﬁ  ve years after a sale are calculated 
by taking homes that were sold in 2006 and observing 
whether they were vacant in 2010. Likewise, the vacancy 
rates calculated for the months close to a sale are based 
on sales in 2009 and 2010. The housing units are included 
in every month-difference group where it is possible to 
observe both sales and vacancies. Altogether, the calcula-
tions involve 85,000 properties and 130,000 sales transac-
tions. I considered a sale a foreclosure if the transaction is 
recorded as a sheriff’s sale.1 
As to the question of whether foreclosed homes are more 
likely to be vacant after the sale, the simplest answer is yes. 
Six to nine months before the sale, the occupancy rates of 
both types of homes are essentially the same (ﬁ  gure 1). By 
the date of the sale, the homes in foreclosure are already 
more likely to be in an extended period of vacancy. After 
the sale, there is a sharp contrast: Homes sold through ordi-
nary transactions are occupied by their new owners within 
a few months. Vacancies among the foreclosed homes 
increase during the same period. 
At six months after a sheriff’s sale, a third of foreclosed 
homes are in an extended period of vacancy. The occu-
pancy of foreclosed homes climbs between seven and 15 
months after the sheriff’s sale, but it plateaus after that. In 
any month from two to ﬁ  ve years after the sale, foreclosed 
homes are two to four times more likely to be vacant than 
those sold through ordinary transactions.
The Foreclosure Process and Vacancy
The connection between foreclosure and vacancy is built 
into the process and institutions. When a foreclosure auc-
tion is scheduled, the sheriff will physically remove the oc-
cupants of a home if they do not vacate voluntarily. Sheriff’s 
auctions differ from ordinary sales in that potential buyers 
have little or no access to the homes beforehand. Buyers 
receive no disclosure documents and cannot sue the previ-
ous owner if an important defect was not disclosed. In some 
states, there is even the possibility (perhaps remote) that the 
previous resident can reclaim the house up to a year after 
the sale if they can come up with funds to repay their debt. 
All of these unknowns and risks strongly discourage individ-
uals from purchasing a home to live in at a sheriff’s sale. In-
vestors are willing to take the risk in some cases (17 percent 
of auction sales in the data). The vast majority (79 percent) 
of the top bidders at sheriff’s sales are banks or the federal 
agencies (Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
Department of Veterans Affairs, and government-sponsored 
enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) that currently 
hold the mortgage.
When a bank purchases a home at sheriff’s sale, the proper-
ty becomes “real estate owned” (REO) on the bank’s books. 
Notes: Foreclosed homes are deﬁ  ned as homes sold at a sheriff’s sale. Nonfore-
closed homes are the remainder of homes sold. Vacancy is deﬁ  ned as a home 
being unoccupied for 90 days or more. Occupancy rates for each month from sale 
include all homes that can be observed with that number of months between the 
sale and the vacancy designation. “Homes exiting REO” includes all homes that 
have a sale observed after the sheriff’s sale. Homes purchased at the sheriff’s sale 
by investors, nonproﬁ  ts, and individuals are included.
Sources: Author’s calculations using all home sales recorded in Cuyahoga County 
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2011-12.indd   5 7/22/2011   9:51:54 PMNotes: The foreclosure gap is the difference between the vacancy rates of homes 
that have been foreclosed and homes that have not. Poverty level refers to the 
census tract. 
Sources: Author’s calculations using all home sales recorded in Cuyahoga County 
from 2006 to 2010 and vacancy data from the U.S. Postal Service. Data on the 
percentage of individuals living in households with income below the poverty line 
are from the 2005–2009 American Community Surveys.
Banks generally hire real estate brokerages to market these 
homes. Although the brokerages enable potential buyers to 
inspect the homes, the banks still insist on selling the proper-
ties as-is. In exchange, they accept a lower price. Despite the 
discount, REO homes may spend more time vacant and on 
the market than other homes. 
Offers from potential buyers must complete the bank’s ap-
proval process, which can take weeks. Also, any undesirable 
feature of a home can both lower its selling price and extend 
its time on the market. Foreclosed homes often are not 
maintained as well as others because the previous occupants 
were in ﬁ  nancial distress and chose not to pay for repairs on 
a house they expected to lose. REO homes sit vacant while 
the processes of attracting a buyer and completing the sale 
move forward relatively slowly. In contrast, homeowner sell-
ers usually do not move out until after the closing.
The REO process can explain most of the large gap be-
tween the occupancy rates of foreclosed and nonforeclosed 
homes in the ﬁ  rst year after their sales. Figure 2 shows the 
percentage of homes that have a second sale recorded after 
the sheriff’s sale. The trends show that banks, investors, and 
nonproﬁ  ts resell properties gradually over the 24 months 
after the auction. Federal Agencies unload most of their 
properties within a year, while individuals (just 4 percent of 
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Investor-owned homes are not technically REO, but inves-
tors seem to behave like banks and to serve a similar purpose. 
Instead of ﬁ  lling sheriff’s-sale homes with tenants, investors 
are reselling them. Within two years, 75 percent of investor-
purchased homes have been sold again. Just as banks buy their 
collateral out of the opaque auction market and then resell via 
broker viewings, investors are taking the risk of purchasing 
at auction and then reselling to buyers who can inspect the 
homes. The bank’s REO process reduces its losses, and the 
investors proﬁ  t from an arbitrage. If investor-owned homes are 
undergoing renovations or being marketed, they are contribut-
ing to the high vacancy rate, just like bank- and agency-owned 
homes. A portion (12 percent to 14 percent) of bank- and 
investor-owned homes do not record a second sale within the 
time observed.
If we focus on the homes that exit REO status or are 
ﬂ  ipped, we still see a large difference between them and 
the nonforeclosed homes. Almost half of the previously 
auctioned homes are recorded in the data as having been 
vacant for 90 days or more at the time of their ﬁ  rst sale after 
the sheriff’s sale (ﬁ  gure 3). The new owners reoccupy these 
homes at a similar pace following the sale, but they are 
starting at lower levels. Fourteen months after being resold, 
80 percent of the homes are occupied. However, a plateau 
is visible in this series as well. Three to ﬁ  ve years after their 
post-auction sale, approximately 20 percent of these homes 
are still vacant.
Home Characteristics and Vacancy
The REO process explains much of the difference in the 
vacancy rates of foreclosed and nonforeclosed properties, 
but not all. The type of homes that go into foreclosure have 
something to do with it as well. In general, lower-value 
homes are more likely to be vacant. More of the homes 
sold in sheriff’s sales are older and located in lower-income 
neighborhoods; 33 percent of nonforeclosed homes were 
built before 1941, compared to 61 percent of foreclosed 
homes; and 27 percent of nonforeclosed homes were locat-
ed in high-poverty census tracts, compared to 60 percent of 
foreclosed homes. (A census tract is considered high poverty 
if at least 15 percent of its residents are living in households 
that fall below the ofﬁ  cial poverty threshold. A household’s 
poverty status depends on the number of people living there 
and the total household income.) 
If we divide up the foreclosure observations according to 
their census tract’s poverty level, we observe that homes 
in middle- and upper-income areas are reoccupied almost 
to the same level as nonforeclosed homes (ﬁ  gure 4). The 
foreclosed homes in high-poverty areas are far less likely to 
be reoccupied at any time 18 to 60 months after the sheriff’s 
sale. The very high vacancy levels in high-poverty neigh-
borhoods are partly a reﬂ  ection of Cuyahoga County’s 
stagnant population. In some strong-market cities, such as 
New York or Los Angeles, surplus housing stock would be 
absorbed by new immigrants.
Figure 5. Foreclosure Gap since the Sheriff’s Sale 
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At this point, we might be ready to say that foreclosure is 
just a temporary problem. Homes may be vacant while 
owned by banks or investors, but after that, they may return 
to the vacancy level that is normal for their age and area. 
However, there is one more angle on the data suggesting 
that foreclosure does have its own long-term impact. We can 
calculate a foreclosure gap—the difference between vacancy 
in foreclosed and nonforeclosed homes—within narrow 
categories. Figure 5 presents one such calculation. 
In low-poverty census tracts, the gap is large at 12 months 
following the sale, as we would expect. The gap shrinks 
to less than 5 percent, but it persists for at least four years. 
Three or four additional points of vacancy may not seem 
like much until you consider that occupancy in low-poverty 
areas often exceeds 95 percent. This foreclosure gap could 
be doubling the probability of vacancy for homes in these 
areas. The pattern is similar in medium-poverty areas, but 
the gaps are bigger. After four years, foreclosed homes’ oc-
cupancy rates are 7 points lower than nonforeclosed homes’. 
In high-poverty areas, the foreclosure gap is large and does 
not trend downward. At any point between 12 and 48 
months after a sale, foreclosure appears to add at least 10 
points to the already high vacancy rate of homes in high-
poverty areas.
Policy Implications
As the analysis here illustrates, homes that have been 
through a sheriff’s sale have very high vacancy rates for a 
year and a half afterward. The data strongly suggest that 
foreclosures leave long-lasting scars on some homes, where 
the foreclosure gap persists for years after the auction, even 
when the comparison is limited to homes in similar areas.
Given the literature that links foreclosure and vacancy to 
lowered property values, policymakers may want to address 
the process in at least two ways. First, keeping homes out of 
foreclosure would avoid creating REO and other vacancies 
that seem to linger among previously foreclosed homes. 
Second, for homes that must go through foreclosure, any 
incentives or changes in administrative procedure that 
could shorten the time in REO would be helpful. As long 
as a home in REO status sits vacant, it diminishes the sales 
prices of all nearby homes on the market. The shorter this 
time is, the fewer homes will be affected. 
However, as with all complex issues, policymakers need 
to be mindful of unintended consequences. For example, 
forcing banks to decrease the length of foreclosed homes’ 
time on the market could cause banks to lower sales prices, 
making the problem worse.
Footnote
1. If a home has a sheriff’s sale anywhere in the data, it is 
not included in the vacancy calculations for nondistressed 
sales. It would be possible for the same property to contrib-
ute to the vacancy calculations based on two non-sheriff’s 
sales (in 2006 and 2008, for example). However, because 
the sale is linked with a vacancy observed in 2010, the same 
home could not contribute twice to a single months-from-
sale vacancy rate unless it had two non-sheriff’s sales within 
one year. A second sale within a year is standard for fore-
closed homes but very rare for never-foreclosed homes.
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